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JURISDICTION STATEMENT
Pursuant to U.C.A §78A-4-103(2)(e), the Utah Co^irt of Appeals has jurisdiction
of this matter, inasmuch as it is an appealfroma court of record in a criminal case not
involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. Did the State lack jurisdiction to prosecute the Defendant? Jurisdiction is a
question of law, subject to a correction of error standard, ^ind according no particular
deference to the trial court. Skokos v. CorradinL 900 P.24 539, 541 (Utah App. 1995).
This was the subject of a specific motion, hearing, and order. 090-130,143-156.
2. Did the trial court err by imposing sanctions on defense counsel? Rule 11
sanctions are subject to a three-tiered analysis: "(1)findingsof fact are reviewed under
the clearly erroneous standard; (2) legal conclusions are reviewed under the correction of
error standard; and (3) the type and amount of sanction to|be imposed is reviewed under
an abuse of discretion standard." Morse v. Packer, 15 P.3^ 1021, 1025,2000 UT 86, ^16.
This was the subject of a specific motion, hearing, and order. 149-156,159-161, 167-186.
3. Did the presiding judge err in failing to disqualify Judge A. Lynn Payne from
hearing the case? Whether a trial court erred in failing to disqualify a judge under Rule
29(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is a question of law, reviewed for
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correctness, and according no particular deference to the trial court. State v. Alonzo. 973
P.2d 975,979 (Utah 1998). This was the subject of a specific motion and order. 012-031,
035-036,039-041.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Article VI, ^[2, United States Constitution:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
Article III, §2, Utah Constitution:
The people inhabiting this State do affirm and declare that they
forever disclaim all right and title to the unappropriated public lands lying
within the boundaries hereof, and to all lands lying within said limits owned
or held by any Indian or Indian tribes, and that until the title thereto shall
have been extinguished by the United States, the same shall be and remain
subject to the disposition of the United States, and said Indian lands shall
remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the
United States.
Rule 3.1, Utah Rules of Professional Conduct:
A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or
controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing
so that is notfrivolous,which includes a good-faith argument for an
extension, modification or reversal of existing law.
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Rule 3.3(a), Utah Rules of Professional Conduct:
A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(2) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling
jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the
client and not disclosed by opposing counsel
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On October 3,2004, Petitioner, Petitioner J.D. Cla^k, who was 16 at the time, was
involved in an altercation at Rock Creek Ranch in Ducheine County, Utah. He, his sister,
and his girlfriend were attending a party at which drugs aiid alcohol were being consumed. As Mr. Clark and the two women were attempting to leave, they were attacked by
several intoxicated persons. In Mr. Clark's attempt to defend his sister and girlfriend, the
intoxicated nephew of a county sheriffs deputy received multiple stab wounds. 003-006.
Mr. Clark was originally charged by information iri Utah's Eighth District Court
with several charges, included attempted murder. The cas^ was dismissed and refiled as a
petition in Utah's Eighth District Juvenile Court, but after two years of litigation was
dismissed, and on November 28, 2006, was again filed against Mr. Clark as an adult in
the Eighth District Court where it was assigned to Judge A. Lynn Payne. 003-006.
On December 7,2006, Mr. Clark moved to have Ji^dge Payne disqualified due to
his long and well-documented hostility toward the Uintah Indians. 012-031. The motion
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was denied on January 22,2007 (039-041), and on Februaiy 12,2007, Mr. Clark filed a
petition with the Utah Supreme Court requesting permission to challenge the trial court's
interlocutory order denying disqualification. 046-047. On February 15,2007, the petition
was assigned by the Utah Supreme Court to the Utah Court of Appeals (052), and on
April 13,2007, the Court of Appeals denied the petition. 071.
On October 29,2007, the State invited Mr. Clark to file a motion challenging the
jurisdiction of the trial Court. 087-089. On December 12,2007, Mr. Clark moved the
court to dismiss the action against him on the grounds that the State could not exercise
criminal jurisdiction over a member of a non-terminated tribe for acts committed on
Indian land. 090-130. On April 22,2008, the State court denied the motion, and ordered
that Mr. Clark's counsel be sanctioned for failing to acknowledge that a ruling of the
Utah Supreme Court must take priority over the federal caselaw cited by Mr. Clark in
support of his motion. 149-156. A hearing was held on May 12,2008, and on June 19,
2008, the trial court sanctioned Mr. Clark's counsel the sum of $700.159-161,167-186.
On November 10,2008, Mr. Clark entered a plea to a reduced charge of
Aggravated Assault, a third degree felony. 206-217. On March 2,2009, a prison sentence
of zero tofiveyears was suspended and he was placed on six years (!) probation, ordered
to serve 125 days in the Duchesne County Jail, and ordered to pay restitution. 225-231.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS- HISTORICAL
1. On October 3,1861, the Uinta Valley Indian re$ervation was created by
executive order of President Abraham Lincoln. Congress confirmed this Order on May 5,
1864, stating that the Uinta Valley was "set apart for the permanent settlement and
exclusive occupation of such of the different tribes of Ind^ns of said [Utah] territory as
may be induced to inhabit the same." Act of May 5,1864J ch. 57,13 Stat 64.103.
2. The Department of the Interior thereupon set upthe Uinta Agency to manage the
affairs of the Uinta Valley Reserve. Those Indians who wfere located in the Uinta Valley
and came under the jurisdiction of the Agency became kn^wn as the "Uintah Band." Few
if any members of the Uintah Band were ethnically Ute. 103.
3. In 1881, the Whiteriver Band and the Uncompalfgre Utes were brought under
military escort to UtahfromColorado. 103.
4. The Uintah Band has always maintained a distinctly different culture and
lifestyle from the other two bands. This included intermaitiage with other tribes and nonIndians, and a higher standard of living and education. Thb Utes: A forgotten People.
Wilson Rockwell (Sage Books, Denver, 1956), pp. 255-2^6,262-263. Accordingly, the
Uintah Band has always been known throughout the reservation as the "Mixed-bloods."
104.
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5. In 1937, the three bands occupying the reservation united under a single
constitution as 'the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation/' The tribal
constitution recognizes that the confederated Ute Indian Tribe consists of the Uintah,
Whiteriver, and Uncompahgre bands. Preamble and Article III, §2, Ute Constitution. The
tribal government consists of an equal number of representatives from each of the three
bands. 104.
6. Congress has recognized the separate existence of the individual bands
subsequent to adoption of the tribal constitution. See, e.g., Act of July 14,1956, Pub.L.
717, ch. 603, 70 Stat. 546. 104.
7. Nothing in the Ute tribal constitution confers upon the confederated Ute Tribe
any power to determine the membership of the individual bands. 104.
8. Until 1956, no roll of the entire Ute Indian Tribe was ever created. Up to that
time, each of the three bands kept their own separate rolls. 104.
9. In 1956, the Ute Tribe expelled three quarters of the membership of the Uintah
Bandfromthe Ute Tribe. At that time, 208 members of the Uintah Band (23.6%) were
placed on a newly-created roll of the entire Ute Tribe mandated by the Ute Partition Act
of August 27,1954,68 Stat. 868,25 U.S.C. §§677-677aa {hereinafter "UPA"). 455
members (51.5%) were placed on a separate termination roll mandated by the same act.
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Another 220 members of the Uintah Band (24.9%) who \lvere living in 1956 were
excludedfromboth Ute rolls, and were subsequently precluded from membership in the
Ute Tribe. In total, the Ute Tribe expelled 76.4% of the Membership of the Uintah Band
from the Ute Tribe. 104-105.
10. There is no mention of the Uintah Band in the KJPA. 104-105.
FACTS - LEGISLATIVE AND ADJtJDICATIVE
A. Tribal Government
11. Prior to 1937, the Uneompahgre Ute, the Uintaih, and the Whiteriver bands
each had a traditional form of tribal government. The government of the Uintah Band
consisted of a meeting of clan elders.
12. Under the Wheeler-Howard Act of June 18,19^4 (48 Stat. 984), better known
as the Indian Reorganization Act (hereinafter "IRA"), tribal lands were to be restored to
Indian tribes, but only if they adopted a constitution approved by the Secretary of the
Interior. 25 U.S.C. §463. Many tribes refused to do so, considering it an affront to their
culture.
13. In 1937, under heavy pressure from the Bureau | of Indian Affairs, the three
bands occupying the reservation adopted a constitution as the Ute Indian Tribe of the
Uintah and Ouray Reservation. The constitution had beenftvrittenfor the tribe by the

s
Bureau. The constitution did not acknowledge any form of traditional tribal government
whatsoever. However, neither did the constitution abolish any such traditional
governments. 104.
14. After the expulsion of the Uintah Bandfromthe Ute Tribe in 1956, the Uintah
Band continued to consist of clans represented by clan elders, as it had prior to adoption
of the 1937 Ute tribal constitution.
B. Congressional Intent
15. The intent of Congress as stated in the UPA was as follows:
a. That termination of federal supervision over the so-called "mixedbloods" would take place in conjunction with termination of the "full-bloods,"
which would be undertaken in short order. 25 U.S.C. §§677, 677w;
b. That the so-called "mixed-bloods," would receive a percentage share in
the tribal assets. 25 U.S.C. §§677h-677i;
c. That any interest the so-called "mixed-bloods" might receive in
indivisible assets of the tribe would be inheritable, 25 U.S.C. §677i; and
d. That those terminated from federal supervision under the UPA would
gain some sort of advantage as United States citizens, previously unavailable, by
abandoning their tribal heritage. 25 U.S.C. §677v.
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16. The "full-blood" Utes were never terminated ifc>m federal supervision.
17. The vast bulk of the assets presumably awarded to the "mixed-bloods" under
the UPA in short order came back under the ownership of the Ute Tribe. See
Termination's Legacy: The Discarded Indians of Utah. Rj Warren Metcalf, University of
Nebraska Press, 2002; The Dispossessed: Cultural Genocide of the Mixed-blood Utes.
Parker M. Nielson, University of Oklahoma Press, 1998. j\pp. B, p. 8. See also Fire on
the Plateau: Conflict and Endurance in the American Southwest Charles Wilkinson,
Island Press, 1999, ch. 8, "Uintah," pp. 148-171.
18. Interests in indivisible assets have been held to|be non-inheritable. United
States v. Murdoch 132 F.3d 534, 540 (10th Cir. 1997).
19. Those terminated under the UPA have gained c(o advantagesfromthe act,
instead being condescended to as outcasts and "half-breeds" by the white community,
while at the same time being excluded from their sacred tribal rights and heritage by the
Ute Tribe. Fifty-plus years of torturous litigation is hardly |a "benefit" of citizenship. See
Metcalf, Nielson, Wilkinson, supra.
20. The policy of termination has beenfirmlyrenounced by Congress and the
Executive, commencing with President Richard Nixon's Special Message to the Congress
on Indian Affairs in 1970. Pub. Papers 564 (Richard M. N}xon, July 8,1970). 104.
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21. Congress' intent in regard to termination is clear and unambiguous. P.L. 103454, Sec. 103(5) states: "Congress has expressly repudiated the policy of terminating
recognized Indian tribes, and has actively sought to restore recognition to tribes that
previously have been terminated." Act of Nov. 2,1994,108 Stat. 4791.
22. Those tribes not explicitly restored to federal recognition by acts of Congress
have been restored through the federal courts, usually due to lack of Due Process in the
termination process. P.L. 103-454, Sec. 103(3). The Uintah Band remains the only tribe
affected by termination era legislation that remains excluded from federal recognition.1
23. The termination policy has never been construed to extend to termination of
tribal existence or identity. See Menominee Tribe v. United States. 391 U.S. 404, 88 S.Ct.
1705,20 L.Ed.2d 697 (1968).
24. In short, the policy objectives of the UPA have failed, the conditions precedent
of the UPA have not been met, the policy of termination itself has been expressly
abandoned and repudiated by Congress, numerous termination acts have been invalidated

1

"Fourteen tribal termination acts were passed between 1954 and 1962. Michael
C. Walch, Note, Terminating the Indian Termination Policy, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1181,
1187 (1983). By 1983, recognition had been restored to six of the tribes affected by these
acts. Id. By late 1994, only the Mixed Blood Utes were unsuccessful in achieving
restoration of their tribal status." L. Scott Gould, The Congressional Response to Duro v.
Reina: Compromising Sovereignty and the Constitution. 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 53, 57,
n. 8 (1994).
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by the courts, and the termination policy itself was never construed to extend to the
obliteration of tribal existence or identity.
C. Territorial Jurisdiction
25. In 1983, a panel of the 10th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Uintah
and Ouray Reservation had been reduced to afractionof its former area. Ute Indian Tribe
of Uintah & Ourav Reservation v. Utah. 716 F.2d 1298 (^0* cir. l9S3Xhereinafter\M

ID26. In 1985, the same court, sitting en banc, overturned the 1983 ruling in Ute II
and held that exclusive tribal and federal criminal jurisdiction extended to the entire
reservation within the original exterior boundaries. Ute Indian Tribe of Uintah & Ouray
Reservation v.Utah, 773 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. en banc 1985), cert denied, 479 U.S. 994,
107 S.Ct. 596, 93 L.Ed.2d 596 {\9U\hereinafter Utelll^
27. In 1994, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the exterior boundaries of the
reservation had been reduced. However, the Supreme Cou)rt did not state to what extent
those boundaries had been reduced. Hagen v. Utah. 510 U^S. 399, 114 S.Ct. 958, 127
L.Ed.2d 252 (1994).
28. In 1997, the 10th Circuit, again sitting en banc,fyeldthat the exterior boundaries
had only been reduced to the extent that lands had actually been homesteaded under the
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1902-1905 acts which opened the reservation to settlement. The court gave explicit
instructions as to how jurisdiction was to be determined on a case-by-case basis, and
placed the burden to establish State jurisdiction in each such case upon the State of Utah.
Ute Indian Tribe of Uintah & Ourav Reservation v. Utah. 114 F.3d 1513 (10th Cir. 1997),
{hereinafter UteV).
29. The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently denied certiorari to review the 10th
Circuit's holding in UteV. The court's holding in that case thus remains the law binding
upon the State of Utah. See Article III, §2, Utah Constitution. UteV. 522 U.S. 1107,118
S.Ct 1034,140L.Ed.2d 101 (1998). 105-106.
30. The trial court does not consider itself bound by the holding in either Ute III or
UteV. instead recognizing only the reservation boundaries described in the vacated
holding of UteJI. 149-156.
FACTS - THE APPELLANT
31. Mr. Clark is a member of the Uintah Band of Indians. 105.
32. The offenses with which Mr. Clark was charged are alleged to have occurred at
Rock Creek Ranch in Duchesne County. 105.
33. Rock Creek Ranch is within the exterior boundaries of the Uintah and Ouray
Indian Reservation. 105.
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34. Rock Creek Ranch has never constituted a homestead or townsite under the
1902-1905 Acts of Congress. 105.
FACTS - JUDGE A. LYNN P^YNE
35. Judge Payne has a long history of animosity toward the Uintah Band, and this
has been and is being addressed in numerous cases. 012-031. State v. Valdez. 65 P.3d
1191 (Utah App. 2003); State v. Reber et aL 2005 UT A^p 485, reversed, 2007 UT 36,
171 P.3d 406, cert denied, Reber v. Utah. 552 U.S. 990, J28 S.Ct. 490,169 L.Ed.2d 339
(2007); Atkins v. Pavne. Case no. 2:08cv52 (D. Utah, Kimball, J.); Reber v. Payne. Case
no. 2:08cv50 (D. Utah, Stewart, J.); Clark v. Pavne. Case Ho. 2:08cv377 (D. Utah,
Campbell, J.), ajfd and dismissed, Case no. 09-4004 (10^ Cir. July 9,2009).
36. Anticipating Judge Payne's hostility toward any effort to address jurisdiction,
Mr. Clark moved on December 7,2006, to have Judge Payne disqualified. 012-031.
37. The motion to disqualify was denied on January 22,2007. 039-041.
38. On February 12,2007, Mr. Clark petitioned the| Utah Supreme Court under
Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure seeking permission for an interlocutory
appeal of the trial court's order denying disqualification. $ee case no. 20070127. 046-047.
39. The Utah Supreme Court assigned the petition t0 the Utah Court of Appeals
on February 15,2007 (050-051), where is was denied on J\pnl 13,2007. 071.
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FACTS - APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
40. On April 24,2007, the Utah Supreme Court issued its opinion in State v. Reber
etaL 2007 UT 36,171 P.3d 406.
41. On July 23,2007, the members of the Uintah Band petitioned the United States
Supreme Court for certiorari review of the Utah Supreme Court's Reber ruling.
Unfortunately, the High Court denied certiorari on October 29,2007. 552 U.S. 990,128
S.Ct.490,169L.Ed.2d339.
42. On the same day, October 29,2007, the State invited Mr. Clark to file a motion
challenging jurisdiction. All parties understood that, in light of the disposition of the
Reber petition before the U.S. Supreme Court, Mr. Clark would be creating a record in
his own case in order to mount a good faith challenge to the Utah Supreme Court's
holding in Reber. 087-089.
43. On December 12,2007, Mr. Clark filed a with the trial court a Motion to
Dismiss and supporting memorandum. Mr. Clark's memorandum set forth the appropriate
federal constitutional, statutory, and case law provisions supporting Mr. Clark's Indian
status. 090-130.
44. On February 22,2008, the State filed a Response to Mr. Clark's Motion to
Dismiss. 143-145. The entire response consisted of a citation to the Utah Supreme
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Court's ruling in State v. Reber. 2007 UT 36,171 P.3d 406, cert denied, 552 U.S. 990,
128 S.Ct. 490,169 L.Ed.2d 339 (2007). 144.
45. At oral argument on the motion to dismiss, Mr. Clark explicitly stated his
belief that the federal authorities cited in the motion to dispiiss contravene and supersede
the Utah Supreme Court's holding in Reber. 273.
46. On April 22,2008, the trial court denied Mr. Clark's motion to dismiss, and
found Mr. Clark's counsel in contempt of court for failing to cite the Reber ruling in the
motion to dismiss. 155.
47. On May 12,2008, Mr. Clark's counsel demonstrated to the trial court that
under Rule 3.3(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, it was sufficient that the
State had cited the Reber case in its response to Mr. Clark's motion to dismiss. Moreover,
Counsel had explicitly addressed Reber during oral argument on April 8,2008.272.
48. On June 19,2008, notwithstanding Rule 3.3(a)(^2), the trial court sanctioned
Mr. Clark's counsel $700.00, apparently for failing to agree with the Reber ruling, let
alone cite it. 167-186.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
L The State cannot exercise criminal jurisdiction over a member of a federally
recognized Indian tribe for acts committed on an Indian reservation. The acts Mr. Clark
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are alleged to have committed took place on Indian land, and Mr. Clark is a member of
the Uintah Band of Indians. The Uintah Band constituted a federally recognized Indian
tribe prior to 1937, and was expelled en massefromthe confederated Ute Tribe in 1956.
However, notwithstanding the Uintah Band was expelledfromthe Ute confederacy, it
was never terminated from federal supervision.
II. The status of the Uintah Band is an issue that will eventually be decided in the
federal courts. However, in order to challenge a state court proceeding in the federal
courts, it is necessary to raise the federal issues in the state proceeding. The State's Reber
ruling has no binding effect on the federal courts. However, in order for Mr. Clark to
bring a federal certiorari or habeas corpus challenge to his state prosecution, he must
raise the federal issues at the trial level. When he did so, the trial court sanctioned him.
The sanctions had no legal basis under the relevant Rules of Professional Conduct.
III. Judge A. Lynn Payne has repeatedly manifested his hostility not only toward
the Uintah Band and its members, but even toward the very mention of the Uintah Band
in his court. Uintah Band members have repeatedly and emphatically sought to draw this
to the attention of both the State and federal courts. Mr. Clark timely attempted to have
Judge Payne removed from this case as well, and the subsequent course of proceedings
demonstrates that this motion was well-founded, and should have been granted.
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ARGUMENT
L The State has no jurisdiction to prosecute Mr, Clark
It is well-established that "[wjithin Indian country, state jurisdiction is limited to
crimes by non-Indians against non-Indians,... and victimless crimes by non-Indians."
Solemv.Bartlett.465U.S.463,465,n.2,104 S.Ct 1161,, 1163,n.2,79L.Ed.2d443
(1984)(Internal citations omitted). Under 18 U.S.C. §§1152 and 1153, the offenses
alleged against Mr. Clark fall under exclusive federal and tribal jurisdiction.
Article VI of the United States Constitution states ih pertinent part:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the Uniteki States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
Article III, §2, of the Utah Constitution states:
The people inhabiting this State do affirm and declare that they
forever disclaim all right and title to the unappropriated public lands lying
within the boundaries hereof, and to all lands lying within said limits owned
or held by any Indian or Indian tribes, and that until the title thereto shall
have been extinguished by the United States, the same shall be and remain
subject to the disposition of the United States, and said Indian lands shall
remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control qfthe Congress of the
United States. (Emphasis added)
"[T]he protection that federal law, treaties, and statytes extend to Indian occupancy
is 'exclusively the province of federal law.'99 Wilson v. Onfoha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. at
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670-671,99 S.Ct at 2539. Under the well-established canons of construction of federal
Indian law, Mr. Clark is a member of a federally recognized tribe that has merely been
omittedfromthe list mandated under 25 U.S.C. §479a. Under both the federal and Utah
constitutions, this federal law is binding upon the Respondent. Accordingly, the State of
Utah had no jurisdiction to prosecute Mr. Clark.
A. The alleged offense took place within Indian country as defined bv federal law.
All lands within the Uintah Valley Reservation that were not homesteaded under
the 1902-1905 Acts of Congress2 remain Indian country as defined under 28 U.S.C.
§1151, and are subject to exclusive tribal and federal jurisdiction. Ute Indian Tribe of
Uintah & Ourav Reservation v. Utah. 114 F.3d 1513,1529 (10th Cir. 1997), cert denied,
522 U.S. 1107,118 S.Ct 1034, 140L.Ed.2d 101 (1998). Specifically, the 10th Circuit
held that when jurisdiction over tribal lands is challenged, the burden rests upon the State
to provide a patent demonstrating that the location in question is on land home-steaded
under the 1902-1905 Acts of Congress. 14 at 1530. Unless and until the State provides
such a patent, the land presumptively remains under exclusive tribal and federal
jurisdiction. Notwithstanding the issue was explicitly raised before the trial court (105-

2

Act of May 27,1902, ch. 888, 32 Stat. 263, Joint Resolution of June 19,1902,
Resolution No. 31, 32 Stat 744, Act of March 3,1903, ch. 994, 32 Stat 997, Act of Apr. 21,
1904, ch. 1402,33 Stat. 189,207-08, Act of March 3, 1905, ch. 1479,33 Stat 1069.
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106), the State to date has never provided a patent demonstrating that Rock Creek Ranch
was homesteaded under the 1902-1905 legislation. The location was thus within Indian
country, subject to exclusive tribal and/or federal jurisdiction, and the sole question
remaining pertains to Mr. Clark's individual Indian status^
B. The Reber case distinguished.
Mr. Clark's petition before the district court set forfe facts indicating that 76.4% of
the Uintah Band membership was expelledfromthe Ute Tfribe in 1956.104-105. Mr.
Clark's allegations raised the questions: (1) How could th$ Ute Tribe expel three quarters
of the Uintah Bandfromits midst without expelling the Uintah Band itselffromthe Ute
Tribe? and (2) Having been thus expelled, how could the itfintah Band as a political unit
be terminated from federal supervision when it is nowhere mentioned in the UPA?
The trial court did not address these questions, holding merely that the matter had
been resolved by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Rebet 2007 UT 36,171 P.3d 406,
cert denied, 552 U.S. 990,128 S.Ct. 490, 169 L.Ed.2d 334 (2007). 151-152. However,
the Utah Supreme Court in Reber had done no more than apply its own reading of United
States v. Murdoch 132 F.3d 534 (10th Cir. 1997). Reber. 2007 UT 36,1flf23-24,171 P.3d
at 410. Moreover, Mr. Reber had carefully set forth before fee Utah Supreme Court how
and why Murdock. as well as the related case of Hackford y. Babbitt 14 F.3d 1457 (10th
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Cir. 1994) are inapplicable to the facts of the Uintah Band. Although both cases addressed both the UPA and the Uintah Band, neither case addressed the effect of the UPA on
the Uintah Band, as in neither case were the federal courts presented With the raw numbers. It is axiomatic that a prior decision cannot be binding precedent on a point not raised
in the briefs or arguments nor discussed in the court's opinion. United States v. L.A.
Tucker Truck Lines, 344 U.S. 33,38,73 S.Ct 67,69,97 L.Ed. 54 (1952). 273, pp. 8-10.
1. Hackford distinguished. Calvin Hackford argued before the 10th Circuit that he
had rights as a member of the Uintah Band, independent of the Ute Tribe. Mr. Hackford
did not ask that court to address the effect of the UPA on the Uintah Band, nor did he ask
that court to address the consequences of the Ute Tribe expelling three quarters of the
Uintah Band membership from the Ute Tribe, and he did not present that court with the
relevant figures.
The 10th Circuit appropriately restricted itself to the question properly before it.
The court reviewed the 1937 Ute constitution and a set of 1950 agreements between the
three bands, and concluded that, as of 1950, the three bands constituted a unified tribe.
Hackford. 14 F.3d at 1461. The court made no further findings in regard to the Uintah
Band and explicitly refrainedfromaddressing Mr. Hackford's separate claims regarding
the Uintah Band, finding that the priority of all water on the reservation datesfromthe
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Executive Order of October 3,1861, regardless of band affiliation. 14 F.3d at 1469.
Having addressed the Uintah Band only through 1^50, the Court then addressed
the relative effects of the UPA on the "Mixed-bloods" an4 "Full-bloods," apparently
drawing no connection whatsoever between the "Mixed-bloods" and the Uintah Band. 14
F.3d at 1461-1464. Nowhere does the opinion remotely suggest that the federal courts
were ever apprised of any such connection. Had the 10th Circuit been informed that the
"Mixed-bloods" constituted 76.4% of the Uintah Band, it ^eems unlikely it would have
avoided addressing this compelling and decisive issue.
2. Murdock distinguished. In 1996, Perry Murdock was prosecuted under 18
U.S.C. §1165 forfishingon tribal lands without a permit, 4nd he appealed his conviction
to the 10th Circuit. Mr. Murdock was born in 1968 to two parents who were included on
the termination roll. His first argument before that court w$s simply that he was a member
of the Ute Tribe, notwithstanding the UPA, and without reference to the Uintah Band.
The 10th Circuit rejected this argument out of hand. Murdock. 132 F.3d at 540.
Mr. Murdock then argued that he had rights as a member of the Uintah Band,
without reference to either the UPA or the expulsion of the Uintah Bandfrom the Ute
Tribe. Id. The 10th Circuit accordingly dispensed of his argument, likewise without
reference to either the UPA or the expulsion of the Uintah Uandfrom the Ute Tribe.
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At no time did Mr. Murdock advise any federal court that the Ute Tribe had
expelled over three quarters of the Uintah Band in 1956, and nowhere did the 10th Circuit
address these facts in its ruling. Indeed, the court based its ruling on nothing more than
the 1937 constitution, without so much as a reference to the subsequent 1950 agreements
between the three bands.
With 1937 as its point of departure, it is fair to say that a court could very well
consider the subsequent effects of the 1954 UPA on the 1937 constitution, and the
subsequent expulsion of the Uintah Bandfromthe Ute Tribe, without doing violence to
the 10th Circuit's Murdock reasoning at all. However, that court could not be expected to
rule on an issue that was not before it. As in Hackford, a review of the record before the
10th Circuit confirms that court was never apprised that 675 out of 883 members of the
Uintah Band were expelled from the Ute confederacy under the pretext of the UPA.
3. Clearly-established Supreme Court precedent. Mr. Clark attempted to establish
before the trial court that under Article VI of the United States Constitution, as well as
Article III, §2, of the Utah Constitution, the trial court could not ignore well-established
principles of Indian law as defined by the United States Supreme Court. 100-103. Those
canons clearly establish that the Uintah Band must of necessity constitute a separate body
from the Ute Tribe, and that the Uintah Band has never been terminated from federal
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supervision:
a. Any ambiguity in an act affecting Indianrightsmust be interpreted in favor of
the Indians against whom the act is directed. "[S]tatutes passed for the benefit of
dependent Indian tribes are to be liberally construed, doubtful expressions being resolved
in favor of the Indians." Alaska Pacific Fisheries Co, v. United States. 248 U.S. 78, 79,39
S.Ct 40,42,63 LJEd. 138 (1918); see also Brvan v. Itasca County. 426 U.S. 373,392,96
S.Ct. 2102,2112,48 L.Ed.2d 710 (1976). This is an "eminently sound and vital canon of
construction." Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hollowbreast 425 U.S. 649,655, n. 7,96
S.Ct. 1793,1797, n. 7,48 L.Ed.2d 274 (1976). 100.
b. Termination is strictly limited to those matters explicitly mentioned in the
termination act. A termination act cannot be imputed to abrogate treatyrightsor terminate
tribal existence. Moreover, the reach of a termination act oi|ly extends to thoserightsand
benefits explicitly mentioned in the act. Menominee Tribe ^. United States. 391 U.S. 404,
412-413, 88 S.Ct. 1705, 1711, 20 L.Ed.2d697 (1968). 101.
c. Any ambiguities in the Ute Partition Act must be qonstrued in favor of those
affected by the Act, i.e.. the so-called "Mixed-Blood Utes." Under the Supreme Court's
Menominee decision, any ambiguities in the UPA must be interpreted in favor o/the socalled "Mixed-blood Utes." United States v. Felter. 752 F.2^ 1505,1511-1512 (10th Cir.
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1985). Specifically, termination cannot be imputed as to any rights not explicitly mentioned in the Act. 752 F.2d at 1512. The Act makes no mention whatsoever of the Uintah
Band. 101.
d. Indian tribes are defined by their status as sovereign political entities, not bv
race. "In dealing with Indians, the federal government is dealing with members or descendants of political entities, that is, Indian tribes, not with persons of a particular race"
Cohen, Felix S., Handbook of Federal Indian Law. (1982 ed.), p. 19, citing United States
v. Antelope. 430 U.S. 641,646, 97 S.Ct. 1395,1399, 51 L.Ed.2d 701 (1977)(Emphasis
added).
[F]ederal regulation of Indian affairs is not based upon
impermissible [racial] classifications. Rather, such regulation is rooted in
the unique status of Indians as "a separate people" with their own political
institutions. Federal regulation of tribes, therefore, is governance of oncesovereign political communities; it is not to be viewed as legislation of a
"'racial' group consisting of'Indians'
"
Id., citing Morton v. MancarL 417 U.S. 535, 553, n.24, 94 S.Ct. 2474, 2484 n. 24,
41 L.Ed.2d 290 (1974). See also Cohen, p. 654. "The Court has also supported its holdings in these cases by characterizing Indians in federal law as apolitical rather than as a
racial classification. The Court said that Indian laws apply by virtue of tribal membership
rather than because of the race of the parties." Cohen, p. 655, citing Fisher v. District
Court. 424 U.S. 382, 390-91, 96 S.Ct. 943, 948,47 L.Ed.2d 106 (1976) (Emphasis
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added). Morton V, ManearL supra. 101-102.
In contrast, race, is synonymous with ancestry, or rhore particularly with "blood
quantum." The Arbitrary Indian. Gail K. Sheffield, Univeitsity of Oklahoma Press, 1997,
p. 133. It is telling that in setting forth the minimum standards for determining whether a
community constitutes a federally recognizable Indian trib^, the Bureau of Indian Affairs
requires only "common Indian ancestry/' but not a minimum blood quantum. 25 C.F.R.,
§83. Indeed, many whole tribes, particularly in the eastern (United States, collectively
possess less "Indian blood" than does even the most dilute member of the Uintah Band.
By every conceivable measure, the Uintah Band clearly constitutes an independent and
pre-existing "sovereign political community." 102.
e. A tribe consists of the majority of its members. Federal law presumes that a tribe
consists of the majority of its members. See, e.g., 25 U.S.CJ §§476(a)(l), 476(c), 1300j(4)(a)(l), 1300k-6(a)(l), 1321(a), 1322(a), 1326. Moreover^ it is clear that a band that acts
independently of a tribe is no longer a part of that tribe. Mofctoya v. United States. 180
U.S. 261, 269-270, 21 S.Ct. 358, 361-362,45 L.Ed. 521 (ISfOl). Since over three quarters
of the membership of the Uintah Band was expelledfromthe Ute Tribe under the pretext
of the UPA, yet the UPA did not (nor could not) obliterate the existence of the Uintah
Band, the Uintah Band must perforce constitute a separate tribefromthe Ute
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confederacy.106-107.
f. The power to determine tribal membership is an essential aspect of sovereignty.
Individual Indian status derivesfromthe status of the tribe. Thus, there can be no Indian
without a tribe. See Epps v. Andrus. 611 F.2d 915 (1st Cir. 1979). "The courts have
consistently recognized that one of an Indians tribe's most basic powers is the authority to
determine questions of its own membership

The power of an Indian tribe to deter-

mine questions of its own membership derivesfromthe character of an Indian tribe as a
distinct political entity." Cohen, supra, p. 20. See also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez.
436 U.S. 49, 72 n. 32, 98 S.Ct 1670,1684 n. 32, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978). 102,108.
i. The Uintah Band cannot be imputed to ever have surrendered this essential
aspect of sovereignty. As noted above, ambiguities in acts affecting Indian tribes must be
interpreted in favor of the Indians affected by those acts. Alaska Pacific Fisheries Co. v.
United States, supra; Bryan v. Itasca County, supra; Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hollowbreast supra. In order to assert that the Uintah Band has no existence today independent
of the Ute Tribe, one would have to imply that upon accepting the 1937 Ute Constitution,
the Uintah Band surrendered this most essential sovereign right to tworivaltribes. This is
contrary to both the most fundamental principles of Indian law, as well as to the facts:
First, nothing in the Ute Constitution explicitly confers such a right on the
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confederated tribe. Second, notwithstanding the existence lof the 1937 Constitution, the
only membership rolls existing prior to 1956 were those kfcpt by the separate bands, and
nothing in the UPA changes this arrangement. Finally, evejm subsequent to the UPA,
Congress was still passing legislation pertaining to the Uinfcih Band as separatefromthe
Ute Tribe, and recognizing both so-called^// and mixed-Hood individuals as members of
the Uintah Band. Act of July 14,1956, Pub. L. 717, ch. 603, 70 Stat 546.
iL Expulsion was an exercise of sovereignty by the pte Tribe. The power of a tribe
to determine its own membership includes not only theriglitof the Uintah Band to
recognize Mr. Clark as one of its members, but of equal importance, it includes the Ute
Tribe's sovereign authority to expel the Uintah Band.
It is important to understand that this is not an internal dispute between the Ute
Tribe and a number of its former members, but an interatrial dispute between the Ute
confederacy on the one hand and a now-separate tribe, the 0intah Band, on the other. The
UPA authorized the termination of certain individualsfromfederal supervision and their
expulsion from the Ute Tribe. That list alone happened to amount to 51.5% of the Uintah
Band. Under the simple principle of majority identity inherent throughout our entire
democratic constitutional system, that identification in itself]would have constituted the
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expulsion of the Uintah Bandfromthe Ute Tribe.3
However, the Ute Tribe went a step further. Independent of any authority granted
to it under the UPA, the Ute Tribe expelled from its ranks an additional 24.9% of the
living members of the Uintah Band, many of whom had already been receiving federal
benefits. Deriving no authority to do sofromthe UPA, this expulsion could only constitute an exercise of the Ute Tribe's sovereign right to determine its own membership. This
right would naturally include the power to expel one of the three bandsfromthe
confederacy.
In sum, neither Hackford nor Murdock addressed the expulsion of the Uintah Band
from the Ute Tribe, because in neither case was the 10th Circuit presented with either the
facts or the argument necessary to address that issue. The question thus remains: How can
three quarters of the membership of a tribe be expelled from a confederation without
expelling the tribe itself? Under the guiding U.S. Supreme Court precedents, as well as
the Ute Tribe's own exercise of its inherent sovereign right to expel any band from its
confederacy, the only reasonable inference is that the Uintah Band has been expelled
from the Ute Tribe.
3

The Ute Constitution itself would seem to mandate such a result, inasmuch as
both the Preamble and Article VI, Section 1, of the Ute Constitution acknowledge that the
tribal constitution is subject to supervening federal law. The UPA would constitute
precisely such a supervening federal law.
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C. The Uintah Band as a body has never been terminatedfromfederal supervision.
A separate questionfromthe expulsion of the Uintah Bandfromthe Ute Tribe is
whether the Uintah Band has ever been terminatedfromfederal supervision. It is hard to
see how this could be so when it has never been mentioned in any termination act As has
already been well-established, termination is strictly limited to those matters set forth in
the termination act. Menominee, supra. Since Congress has never expressed any intention
whatsoever to terminate the Uintah Band's eligibility for federal benefits, no such
intention can be inferred. 107.
But the inquiry does not stop there. Congress has exjpressly repudiated termination,
the very pretext under which the Ute Tribe expelled the Uintah Band. "[W]here Congress
has made its intent clear, we must give effect to that intent.*' Miller v. French. 530 U.S.
327, 336,120 S.Ct. 2246,2253,147 L.Ed.2d 326 (2000). "As always, we begin with the
language of the statute and ask whether Congress has spoken on the subject before us. If
the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; |for the court, as well as the
agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed indent of Congress." Norfolk &
Western v. American Train Dispatchers Association. 499 U[S. 117,128, 111 S.Ct 1156,
1163,113 L.Ed.2d 95 (1991).
Congress has made clear its intent to repudiate termination. The expulsion of the
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Uintah Bandfromthe Ute Tribe rests upon established and undisputable facts. Once that
expulsion is acknowledged, the sole question remaining is whether the termination of
federal supervision over a portion of the Uintah Band's members can be reasonably
construed to constitute termination of the Uintah Band as a whole. Such a conclusion is
untenable for a number of reasons:
1. Identity Theft. As set forth in Hackford, the 1950 agreements permit the whole
Ute Tribe to exercise the treaty rights originally belonging exclusively to the Uintah
Band. Hackford. 14 F.3d at 1461,1469. The whole Uintah Band was a party to the 1950
agreements, and yet the Uintah Band that was party to those agreements consisted almost
entirely of those persons denominated a mere four years later as "mixed-bloods." Since
1956, the Ute Tribe has claimed for itself all therightsof the Uintah Band as a political
unit while aggressively excluding the membership of that unit from its midst.
To impute termination to the Uintah Band as a whole would thus create the strange
anomaly of a federally recognized tribe exercising therightsof a terminated tribe still
living on an existing reservation. In short, imputing termination to the Uintah Band as a
whole would effectively sanction the biggest case of identity theft in history. This is in
fact what has been going on.
What does the Uintah Band consist of if not its membership? Congress has never
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presumed to possess the power to separate a tribe's identiljy from its members. "Our
decisions, while recognizing that the government has powfcr to control and manage the
property and affairs of its Indian wards in good faith for tfyeir welfare, show that this
power is subject to constitutional limitations and does not enable the government to give
the lands of one tribe or band to another, or to deal with tfyem as its own." Chippewa
Indians of Minnesota v. United States, 301 U.S. 358, 375-^76, 57 S.Ct 826, 833, 81
L.Ed. 1156 (1937)(Emphasis added).
2. Deprivation of Due Process. 23.6% of the Uintah Band remained enrolled in the
Ute Tribe. If the 455 Uintah Band members on the termination roll are factored out, those
Uintahs living at the time who were expelledfromthe Ute tribe outside the authority of
the UPA would constitute 51.4% of the Band, leaving 48.6% of the Uintah Band enrolled
in the Ute Tribe. On the other hand, if the 220 Uintah Band ljnembers excluded from both
rolls are factored out, the 455 constitute 68.6% of the band, leaving 31.4% enrolled in the
Ute Tribe. No matter how one views the figures, imputing termination to the Uintah Band
as a political unit would effectively terminate the treaty rights of the small minority of
Uintah members who nevertheless remained members of the tJte Tribe and the 24.9% of
the Band who were never included on either Ute roll. How could these two groups be
stripped of federal recognition without offending the principl0s of Due Process?
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3. Termination of the Uintah Band is outside the scope of the UPA. In short, the
UPA itself has failed of its essential purpose, and Congress has clearly and unambiguously expressed its intent with regard to all termination acts. A state ruling (Reber) that is so
at odds with clearly established federal precedent must be challenged. Young v. Sirmons,
486 F.3d 655 (10th Cir. 2007) "If a statute is clear and unambiguous, the court must
interpret the statute to effect the unambiguous intent of Congress, regardless of the
interpretation given to the statute by an administrative agency with responsibility for
enforcement." Mt. Emmons Mining Co. v. Babbitt, 117 F.3d 1167, 1170 (10th Cir. 1997).
Prior to 1937, the Uintah Band clearly constituted a tribe separately acknowledged
by the United States. After 1937, it clearly retained that recognition under the penumbra
of the confederated Ute Tribe. Thus, the Uintah Band has not been excluded from the list
of tribes eligible under 25 U.S.C. §479a due to any failure to qualify, nor to having been
terminated, but merely because no court has ever acknowledged its subsequent expulsion
from the Ute confederacy.
The question is not one of challenging or invalidating the UPA, but of simply
addressing matters that are and always have remained outside its scope. The UPA did not
mandate expulsion of the Uintah Band. It simply did so de facto, by sheer weight of
numbers, and the Ute Tribe zealously extended that expulsion, solely under the pretext of
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the UPA. The UPA did not mandate termination of the Uintah Band. However, the Ute
Tribe, the State of Utah, and indeed, even the Secretary of (the Interior have treated the
vast majority of Uintah Band members as terminated, regardless of whether they were
among the 455. This, too, was done under the pretext of th0 UPA, not under its actual
terms. Finally, the UPA never mandated that the name,rights,and identity of the Uintah
Band be takenfromits membership and given to tworivaltribes. This was done under a
pretext. It's time for the pretext to end.
D. The Uintah Band continues to maintain a traditioHtal form of government.
It is important to understand the significance of the HJintah Band being expelled
from the Ute Tribe. Once that expulsion has taken place, it IJLO longer matters how the Ute
Constitution defines tribal membership or how many members of the Uintah Band sit on
the Business Committee. They do not govern the Uintah Band. By analogy, the
Commonwealth of Virginia can continue to seat in its legislature as many representatives
from the State of West Virginia as it likes. That does not mal^e West Virginia any less of a
sovereign state, nor does it give the Commonwealth any authority whatsoever over those
forty former western counties.
It is also important to understand that no confederated!Ute Tribe existed until the
1937 constitution was adopted under the Indian Reorganization Act. The IRA was an
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attempt by the federal government to bring a halt to the ravages of the allotment program
undertaken from the 1880fs onward, and to restore a measure of independence to Indian
tribes. Under the IRA, tribes were encouraged to adopt tribal constitutions and to
incorporate as business entities. The policy has subsequently come under heavy criticism:
The Act itself continues to be viewed controversially in Indian
country as another example of the imposition of "white man's law and
standards." This view is somewhat ironic given the Act's supposed
commitment to tribal self-government. Critics find support in the fact that
the tribal constitutions and tribal corporate charters adopted pursuant to the
legislation were, in most instances, prepared in advance by the Bureau of
Indian Affairs and reflected little, if any, tribal input and retained
substantial review authority within the BIA.
Frank Pommersheim and Terry Pechota, Tribal Immunity. Tribal Courts, and the
Federal System: Emerging Contours and Frontiers. 31 SJD.L.Rev. 553 (1986), p. 556. See
also Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law. 1982 ed. pp. 149-150.
The biggest criticism of the IRA is that it ignored traditional tribal systems of
government, which had been based on consensus and heredity. Robert B. Porter,
Strengthening Tribal Sovereignty through Government Reform: What are the Issues? 7
Kan. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 72 (1997), pp. 74-76; Eric Lemont, Developing Effective
Processes of American Indian Tribal Constitutional and Governmental Reform: From the
Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma. Hualapai Nation, Navajo Nation, and Northern Chevenne
Tribe. 26 Am. Indian L. Rev. 147 (2001), pp. 152-155.
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While some tribes rejected the IRA constitutions entirely, and some managed to
create a system in which both traditional and IRA-imposed systems coexisted, the
majority of tribes simply acquiesced to the IRA strictures 4t the expense of traditional
government. Robert D. Cooter, Wolfgang Fikentscher, Indian Common Law: The Role of
Custom in American Indian Tribal Court. 46 Am. J. Compj L. 287 (1998), p. 321.
Perhaps few tribes illustrate the failures of the IRA as well as does the Ute Tribe.
Prior to 1937, each of the three bands, the Uintahs, the Whjterivers, and the Uncompahgre
Utes, was governed by a traditional tribal government. Whfri the three bands imited under
the IRA in 1937, those traditional governments were eclipsed. However, the traditional
tribal governments were never abolished. They were simply ignored. When the Uintah
Band was expelledfromthe Ute Tribe, the people of necessity reverted back to their
traditional form of clan representation. Those clans have never ceased to exist. They have
never ceased to have tribal elders to attend tribal gatherings.) However, given the
horrendous destruction of identity the Uintah Band has faced under the Ute Partition Act,
as evidenced by at least three thorough studies on the subject,4 it should come as no
surprise that the Uintah Band has been reluctant to expose it$ traditional tribal
government to public annihilation.

4

See Metcalf, Nielson, Wilkinson, supra, p. 9, para. 17.
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n. The trial court erred by imposing sanctions on Mr. Clark's trial counsel.
Rule 3.1, Utah Rules of Professional Conduct:
A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or
controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing
so that is notfrivolous,which includes a good-faith argument for an
extension, modification or reversal of existing law.
Rule 3.3(a), Utah Rules of Professional Conduct:
A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(2) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling
jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the
client and not disclosed by opposing counsel.
Mr. Clark's rights as an Indian fall exclusively within the province of federal law.
"[T]he protection that federal law, treaties, and statutes extend to Indian occupancy is
'exclusively the province of federal law.9" Timpanogos Tribe v. Conway. 286 F.3d 1195,
1203 (10th Cir. 2002), citing Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe. 442 U.S. 653,670-671,99
S.Ct. 2529,2539, 61 L.Ed.2d 153 (1979), quoting Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v.
County of Oneida. 414 U.S. 661,670, 94 S.Ct 772, 779, 39LEd.2d 73 (1974).
Thus, if the state courts do not recognize Mr. Clark's rights, he will ultimately
need to take this case into federal court, either on a petition to the U.S. Supreme Court for
writ of certiorari, or by a habeas corpus action under 28 U.S.C. §2254. In either case, it is
well-established that a petitioner before the federal courts cannot raise a federal issue that
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was not first raised before the state trial court. Hiner v. Defere & Co., 340 F.3d 1190, 1196
(10th Cir. 1998); Yellowbear v. Wyoming Att'v General 5^5 F.3d 921 (10th Cir. 2008).
The trial court was fully aware that the Uintah Bandl had already petitioned the
U.S. Supreme Court to review the Utah Supreme Court's holding in Reber. The trial court
was specifically aware that the U.S. Supreme Court had defied certiorari, and that Mr.
Clark was creating a record to pursue a collateral federal challenge to the Reber ruling.
087-089. Mr. Clark thus cited the appropriate federal prece4ents in his motion to dismiss
before the trial court (092-130), and the State responded by siting the Utah Supreme
Court's Reber ruling. 144. Thus the requirements of both Rujles 3.1 and 3.3(a)(2) of the
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct werefollycomplied with.
There was no factual violation of any ethical rules. Thus, under the three-tiered
approach set forth in Morse v. Packer. (1) the trial court's factual finding was clearly
erroneous; (2) the court's legal conclusion based on that erroneous finding was in error;
and (3) with no factual or legal basis, any sanction whatsoever would constitute an abuse
of discretion. 15 P.3d 1021,1025, 2000 UT 86, ^[16. The sanction should therefore be
reversed.
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HI. The trial judge should have been disqualified due to manifest bias.
As a general rule, a judge has a duty to preserve the integrity and
independence of the judiciary and should disqualify herself in a proceeding
in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. The word
"reasonable" connotes the idea that judges are not subject to
disqualification in every situation where there impartiality is questioned,
particularly when the potential for bias is remote
Scholars discussing
this principle have described it as the "reasonable person" test. This test
looks to see whether a reasonable person, knowing all the circumstances,
would believe that the judge's impartiality could be questioned,"
West Jordan City v. Goodman, 135 P.3d 874, 880, 2006 UT 27. "A judge should
recuse himself when his impartiality might reasonably be questioned." State v. Neely, 748
P.2d 1091,1094 (Utah 1994), cert, denied, 487 U.S. 1220, 108 S.Ct 2876,101 L.Ed.2d
911 (1988). "Obviously, actual bias need not be found to support disqualification. An
appearance of bias or prejudice is sufficient for disqualification . . . We note that
disqualification due to the appearance of bias or prejudice seems more amenable to
prospective application." Madsen v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n. 767 P.2d 538,
544, n. 5 (Utah 1988).
Under Rule 29(c)(3)(B), a reviewing judge must assign another judge if the
affidavits in support of a motion to disqualify are legally sufficient. Judge Anderson erred
in finding the affidavits insufficient, applying criteria unsupported by any rule or caselaw.
Contrary to Judge Anderson's finding, all of the supporting affidavits were based on

39
personal knowledge. The issue before the court was JudgelPayne's bias, as demonstrated
by a consistent pattern over a period of years and years. Contrary to Judge Anderson's
observation, the issue in those prior cases was identical to ^he issue in the present case,
i.e., prejudice against Indians in general and members of the Uintah Band in particular.
Indeed, it is hard to see how affidavits demonstrating bias 4ould ever refer to anything
other than "entirely separate matters" when a motion to disqualify must befiledwithin 20
days after a judge is assigned to the case. The affidavit of counsel refers to specific
conduct witnessed in the courtroom. Since the rule calls for affidavits, it is not clear in
what other form Judge Anderson would have the relevant appellate cases brought to a
reviewing judge's attention. Those cases are mentioned to demonstrate that Judge Payne's
bias is nothing new, and has been preserved for the record aftd raised as an issue in prior
cases.
On the one hand, Judge Andersonfindsthat the allegations by eyewitnesses are
merely "hearsay." On the other hand, his ruling suggests that| facts demonstrating bias that
were part of a prior court record and were challenged on appeal cannot be relied upon
either. Between these two extremes, it would thus appear to be impossible to bring any
allegation of bias that Judge Anderson would consider legally sufficient.
"[F]or alleged bias and prejudice to be disqualifying [fy] must... result in an
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opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learnedfromhis
participation in the case." United States v. Grinnell Corp.. 384 U.S. 563, 583, 86 S.Ct
1698,1710,16 L.Ed.2d 778 (1966). Disqualification is warranted "when it appear[s] that,
apartfromthe judge's analysis of the issues of fact or law, he had such a bias in favor of
one party or prejudice against the other that he could not fairly and impartially determine
the issues." Orderville Irrigation Co. v. Glendale Irrigation Co., 17 Utah 2d 282,288,409
P.2d 616,621 (Utah 1965).
The affidavits demonstrated that Judge Payne is biased against members of the
Uintah Band. The appellate record, and particularly his sanctioning of counsel in the
present case, demonstrate that he consistently decides Indian jurisdiction issues on bases
other than those presented to him in the briefs. This is the very definition of bias, and the
judge should have been disqualified.
CONCLUSION
The State was without jurisdiction to prosecute Mr. Clark, and this was properly
brought to the trial court's attention. The sanction imposed against counsel for bringing
the motion was improper, and was based entirely upon the prejudice and bias of the trial
judge. The conviction of Mr. Clark and the sanction against his counsel should both be
reversed.

41

DATED this 24th day of December, 2009.

Michael L. Humiston
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
CERTIFICATE REGARDING ADDENDUM
I hereby certify under Rule 24(a)(l 1) that no addendtim is necessary, as all
pertinent materials have been identified by citations to the rjscord.

Michael L. Humiston
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICER
I certify that two copies of the foregoing Appellant's Opening Brief were mailed to
the following this 24th day of December, 2009.
Utah Attorney General
Appellate Division
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854

